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ABSTRACT 
The European Commission has successfully managed to adopt and 
implement ex ante impact assessment procedures since 2003, and 
available data show that the IA documented are of increasingly 
good quality. Even though margins for improving the European 
Commission IA system persist, other EU institutions and almost all 
EU member states significantly lag behind in terms of IA 
implementation. The experience of past research projects, including 
the European Network for Better Regulation and the recent OECD 
EU15 project confirmed that at national level IA features a high 
adoption-implementation gap. This paper draws on EU and 
international experience to draw some recommendations, which 
include the need for more sophisticated legal and economic analysis 
in RIA, to make it a more credible instrument for ex ante policy 
appraisal; and the need for gradually introduced, carefully 
designed RIA system which take advantage of the enormous success 
obtained by other, simpler models, such as the Standard Cost Model 
for the measurement and reduction of administrative burdens.   
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ANDREA RENDA1 
INTRODUCTION: A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING LANDSCAPE 
 
egulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) is considered as one of the most 
useful tools for the scrutiny of the flow of regulation, as well as a 
powerful regulatory governance instrument. Several countries around 
the world feature some form of RIA, which takes various forms and serves 
different purposes depending on the context in which the procedure is 
introduced. Compared with other tools such as the measurement of 
administrative burdens, the introduction of consultation procedure or the 
practice of ex post monitoring and evaluation, RIA appears to require a more 
profound change in the culture of public administrations and bureaucrats, and 
has therefore encountered significant problems in its implementation around 
the world. From an international perspective, the first countries that managed 
to mainstream RIA into their policymaking process were notably common law 
countries, especially within the broader context of public management reforms 
– e.g. the New Public Management wave in the UK, the Reinventing 
Government in the United States2. Other countries, in particular civil law 
countries, have committed resources to the development of ex ante RIA 
practices, but for many years have failed to fully implement RIA for a 
substantial part of their flow of legislation. Accordingly, a conspicuous 
adoption-implementation gap has emerged, as observed by several scholars in 
the past few years3.  
Against this background, the international RIA landscape appears more like a 
patchwork of very different experiences and alternate fortunes, rather than a 
consistent and parallel development. One scholar has compared the practice of 
comparing RIA systems around the world to that of comparing apples and 
pears, given the existing divergence in the way national governments have 
attempted to mainstream this procedure in their policymaking process4.  
More in detail, RIA systems differ according to a number of characteristics, 
including the following: 
 Scope. Some countries have introduced mandatory RIA only for secondary 
legislation (e.g. the United States), whereas other legal systems require it 
                                                   
1  Senior Research Fellow, Head of Regulatory Affairs, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels 
(Belgium); Professor of Antitrust and Regulation, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome (Italy). 
2 Renda (2006) 
3 Radaelli 
4 Radaelli 
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also for primary legislation or even for non-binding policy documents (e.g. 
the European Union). Some countries limit RIA to certain sectors (e.g. 
network industries, or proposals to implement EU legislation), whereas 
others apply them to all the new legal proposals. Some countries have 
enacted thresholds to select the proposals that should undergo RIA (e.g., the 
US, the UK), whereas in other systems there is no such threshold, and the 
selection follows other principles, including that of proportionate analysis 
(e.g. the EU).  
 Purpose. In some countries RIA serves the main purpose of enabling the 
monitoring of the performance of bureaucrats, within a principal-agent 
scheme between the government and its administration (e.g. the United 
States). To the contrary, in other legal systems the main purpose has been 
in-house learning (the EU), or specific targets to contrast poverty (Ireland), 
reduce administrative burdens (the Netherlands, Germany), allow for 
dialogue with the business sector (Sweden) or even the reduction of 
corruption through greater transparency and accountability (as in several 
developing countries).  
 Methodology and quantification. Different scopes and different 
purposes are also reflected in a different emphasis being placed on the 
quantification and monetization of impacts in different countries. Eastern 
European countries, such as Poland and in particular Ukraine, have 
traditionally placed more emphasis on RIA as an explanatory document, and 
as such have made limited use of quantitative cost-benefit analysis in their 
RIA documents; on the other hand, the United States have devoted growing 
efforts to the monetization of impacts, including non-market goods such as 
biodiversity or the value of human lives, in order to increase the 
transparency of decision-making and the measurability of impacts over time. 
Also the European Commission has strengthened the emphasis on 
quantitative analysis since 2005, and later with the appointment of the 
Impact Assessment Board.  
 Governance and oversight. In several countries there is a single, 
dedicated unit nested in the centre of government, with the role of 
consultant, advisor and/or adversarial gatekeeper for the departments, 
ministries or other bodies in charge of drafting the RIA document. In some 
countries the whole RIA process is managed by the Cabinet Office (e.g., the 
UK, Italy), in others by the Ministry of Economy or Finance (e.g., the 
Netherlands, Slovakia), in others by the Ministry of Justice (e.g., Hungary) 
or the Ministry of Interior (the Czech Republic), depending on the purpose 
and scope of the RIA system. In addition, some countries have appointed ad 
hoc external oversight bodies in charge of monitoring the RIA activity 
performed by the government: in most cases these bodies – such as Actal in 
the Netherlands, the Normenkontrollrat in Germany or the Regulatory 
Policy Commission in the United Kingdom – have a more specific mandate 
confined to the measurement of administrative burdens or the compliance 
costs of legislation. Finally, in some countries other bodies, such as courts of 
auditors, perform an ex post oversight function (e.g. the NAO in the UK, the 
GAO in the US, the Dutch Court of Audit, the European Court of Auditors, 
etc.). 
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 Effective implementation. Past research projects such as the European 
Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) have shown that, despite a general 
trend towards the adoption of the RIA system, only a fistful of European 
countries have effectively reached a significant number of RIAs published 
(see Section 3 below). Cases in which RIA has emerged as a key step in the 
policy process include to some extent the United Kingdom and non-EU 
countries such as Ukraine. In all other countries, the situation was less 
encouraging, although the past 2-3 years have shown some sign of 
development in countries like Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands and, most 
recently, France.  
This short paper draws on the experience of the DIADEM database within 
ENBR and also on similar research projects (including EVIA, the SSIA project 
for the European Commission DG EMPL, the IA-TOOLS project of the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, etc.) to describe the current 
trends in the adoption and implementation of RIA in European countries and 
beyond. In particular, Section 1 below provides a description of the EU impact 
assessment experience and illustrates data on the 475 IAs completed by the 
European Commission between 2003 and end 2009. Section 2 looks at the 
characteristics of RIA in the EU27, and focuses on specific trends emerged in 
the past few years, such as the need for centralized oversight, the focus on 
administrative and compliance costs, the refinement of methodological 
guidance, the completion of the policy cycle with monitoring and ex post 
evaluation, and appointment of external oversight bodies in charge of 
overseeing the governmental RIA activity. Section 3 concludes by offering some 
thoughts on the current state of the debate on RIA, including the oft-neglected 
problem of how to improve the methodological approach to ex ante policy 
appraisal.  
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1 IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
EVOLUTION AND RESULTS 
1.1 Impact assessment in the EU: a brief account 
The EU experience in regulatory impact assessment began in 1986, when the 
UK took its turn in the Presidency of the Council. For this reason, the impact 
analysis procedure introduced – called Business Impact Assessment (BIA) – 
closely echoed the UK model of Compliance Cost Assessment.5 The BIA system 
was subject to heavy critiques, mostly related to its incompleteness and 
uncertain institutional setting. This led the Commission to issue in 2001 a 
White Paper on European Governance and the Lisbon Council to mandate the 
creation of a high-level advisory group (the ‘Mandelkern Group’) for the 
drafting of an “action plan for better regulation” and the definition of a new 
model of impact assessment to be implemented at Community level. The 
Mandelkern Group was created to “set out by 2001 a strategy for further co-
ordinated action to simplify the regulatory environment, including the 
performance of public administration, at both national and Community level”, 
and after the Ministers for Public Administration from EU members states had 
signed the Strasbourg Resolution in November 2000, mandating the advisory 
group to “develop a coherent approach to this topic and to submit proposals to 
the Ministers, including the definition of a common method of evaluating the 
quality of regulation.” 
The Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance clarified the 
Commission’s agenda for the establishment of new better regulation standards 
in the EU.6 The preparatory report of the working group on evaluation and 
policy recommended the use of cost-benefit analysis as the most complete and 
accurate methodology in the evaluation of proposed legislations.7 However, 
exact economic calculations were considered not to be the most important 
contributors to regulatory quality. Rather, the working group took a ‘lesson-
drawing’ approach by stating that observing the international experience and 
undertaking contextualised benchmarking are the most important steps 
towards a compete understanding of the logic of decision-making. The working 
group also suggested that monitoring existing EU legislation was at least as 
important as evaluating the expected impact of new regulation.8  
A few months after the publication of the White Paper on European 
Governance, the Mandelkern Group on Better Regulation published its final 
report. The report, still considered as one of the key reference on RIA at the 
international level – specified some of the features of the prospective new RIA 
                                                   
5 See Section 1.2.1 below. 
6 See European Commission, White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001)727, 25 July 
2001. 
7 See Preparatory Work for the White Paper, op. cit., Section 3.2.1, p. 91. 
8 Ibid., Section 3.3.3, p. 92. 
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model, suggesting its adoption by the Commission before June 2002 and its 
application to all Commission proposals with possible regulatory effects.9 The 
Mandelkern Report contained a set of recommendations for an effective 
implementation of such procedure. The Mandelkern Group also recommended 
the adoption of a ‘dual stage’ RIA model, with a preliminary impact assessment 
devoted to the analysis of alternative regulatory options and an extended impact 
assessment in which the detailed assessment of the benefits and costs of the 
preferred regulatory option is performed. After a specific call for action issued 
by the European Council meetings of Göteborg and Laeken, the Commission 
announced its Action Plan for Better Regulation in June 2002. The new impact 
assessment model was introduced as part of this wider Action Plan, together 
with a communication aimed at simplifying and improving the regulatory 
environment and measures aimed at promoting “a culture of dialogue and 
participation” within the EU legislative process. 10  
The new integrated impact assessment (IIA) model introduced in 2002 – which 
incorporates not only the economic impact, but also the social and 
environmental impact of the proposals concerned – adopted initially a ‘dual 
stage’ approach. All Commission initiatives proposed for inclusion in the 
Annual Policy Strategy or the Commission Legislative and Work Programme 
and requiring some regulatory measure for their implementation – thus 
including not only regulations and directives, but also White Papers, 
expenditure programmes and negotiating guidelines for the international 
agreements – must undergo a ‘preliminary impact assessment’.11 Moreover, a 
selected number of proposals with large expected impact, are subjected to a 
more in-depth analysis called ‘extended impact assessment’.  
The Commission assessed the first results of its new Integrated Impact 
Assessment model in December 2004, by drawing a mixed picture on the 
progress made in improving the quality of EU legislation. A first measure was to 
request services to establish ‘Roadmaps’ for the initiatives they have put forward 
                                                   
9 Mandelkern Group, Final Report (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
secretariat_general/impact/docs/mandelkern.pdf  – visited 2 August 2005).  
10 During 2002 and early in 2003, the Commission developed its Action Plan through eight 
targeted Communications, at the same time defining with the European Parliament and the 
Council an overall strategy on better law-making. The Communications addressed the 
following issues: 1) General principles and minimum standards for consultation 
(COM(2002)704); 2) the collection and use of expertise (COM(2002) 713); 3) impact 
assessment (COM(2002) 276), including internal Guidelines; 4) Simplifying and improving 
the regulatory environment (COM(2002) 278); 5) proposal for a new comitology decision 
(COM(2002) 719); 6) operating framework for the European Regulatory Agencies 
(COM(2002) 718); 7) framework for target-based tripartite contracts (COM(2002) 709); and 
8) Better monitoring of the application of community law (COM(2002) 725). 
11 Proposals that are exempted from impact assessment include: a) Green Papers where the 
policy formulation is still in process; b) periodic Commission decisions and reports; c) 
proposals following international obligations; d) executive decisions, such as “implementing 
decisions, statutory decisions and technical updates, including adaptations to technical 
progress”; and e) Commission measures deriving from its powers of controlling the correct 
implementation of Community Law (although the Commission may in some instances decide 
to carry out an impact assessment). See Communication on impact assessment, COM(2002) 
276, 5 June 2002, Section 2 (“Coverage”). 
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for inclusion in the Annual Policy Strategy (APS) and in the Commission’s Work 
Programme.12 But several sources of pressure were calling for some major effort 
from the Commission in order to significantly improve the momentum of better 
regulation efforts, with specific emphasis on strengthening and improving 
impact assessment methods.  
The Commission took action in March 2005 with a new Communication on 
Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs in the European Union, defining the 
achievements of the first years of implementation of the IIA as “first steps in 
what must be a permanent effort”.13 Recent major steps in the Commission’s 
better regulation agenda include the following: 
• Since 2005, the re-launch of the Lisbon agenda under the name “Partnership 
for growth and jobs” has identified better regulation as one of the main 
pillars of competitiveness and sustainable development in Europe14. The 
dual-stage IIA system was replaced by a single document (IA), and the depth 
of analysis relies on the application of the principle of proportionate analysis 
(see box 1 below). 
• The European Parliament and the Council have been increasingly involved 
in the better regulation agenda, a tendency which culminated in the 2003 
Inter-Institutional Agreement on Better Lawmaking and the 2005 
agreement on a “common approach” to impact assessment15. 
• In late 2006, the Commission appointed an Impact Assessment Board (IAB), 
responding to repeated calls for better quality assurance mechanisms and 
stronger coordination in the ex ante assessment activities carried out by the 
various DGs16.  
• In January 2007, the Commission launched its Action Programme for the 
measurement and reduction of administrative burdens generated by EU 
legislation17. 
• The Commission reviewed its minimum standards for external consultation 
in 2007. It confirmed the current rules and decided to apply them more 
effectively by improving feedback, ensuring plurality of views, etc. The newly 
appointed IAB must check that these standards are correctly applied. 
• The Commission gradually strengthened its Simplification Rolling 
Programme, which covers 164 measures for 2005-2009 and is now part of 
the annual work programme. The Commission has already proposed or 
                                                   
12 See European Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment: Next Steps, cit. 
13 See the Communication on Better Regulation for Growth and Jobs, op. cit., note 172.  
14 See COM(2005)24, at §3.2.3. 
15 Both documents can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/ better_regulation/ 
ii_coord_en.htm. 
16 For a short description of the IAB, see http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ iab_en.htm.  
17 COM(2007)23 final, 24 January 2007. 
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adopted 91 such measures, and envisages the adoption of 44 new measures 
in 200818. 
• An ex post evaluation of the Commission’s IA system was completed in April 
2007, with overall mixed results and a number of suggestions for improving 
the system in the future19. 
• A consultation on the future of the smart regulation agenda in the EU was 
launched in 2010, with a view to collecting stakeholder views on how to 
improve the system in the years to come.  
Today, the Commission IA system is firmly nested into the Commission’s policy 
cycle. The second Barroso Commission has so far placed emphasis on the need 
to perform ex post evaluation before any new IA is undertaken (which reinforces 
the analysis of the status quo and calls for the completion of the policy cycle). 
The IA procedure, coupled with stakeholder consultation, takes approximately 
52 weeks to be completed, before the Commission proposal can indeed be 
finalized and sent – where appropriate – to other EU institutions. Figure 1 
below shows the Commission policy process and the corresponding timing of 
IA.  
Figure 1 – The European Commission’s policy process 
 
Source: European Commission, Impact Assessment Guidelines, 15 January 2009 
 
1.2 Impact assessment in the EU: a look at the evidence  
1.2.1 The European Commission: progress achieved and margins for 
improvement 
The European Commission has certainly achieved important results in 
mainstreaming IA in its policymaking process, though important margins for 
improvement remain. At the end of 2009, the European Commission had 
completed 475 IAs, distributed as in Figure 2 below.  
                                                   
18 See the Commission Communication on the Second Strategic Review of Better Regulation in 
the European Union, COM(2008)32, 30 January 2008. 
19 See the main report at http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/docs/key_docs/ 
tep_eias_final_report.pdf.  
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Figure 2 – Number of IAs per year at the European Commission 
 
Source: CEPS (2010 data estimated from Commission roadmaps) 
 
The number of IAs has been increasing significantly since 2006, although 2009 
marked a slow-down due mostly to the transition towards a new European 
Commission and a new European Parliament. In 2010, at least 140 IAs are 
expected according to the available 2010 roadmaps20. 
However, not all Commission DGs have been involved in the process in the 
same way. Figure 3 below shows that some DGs – i.e. Transport and Energy 
(TREN), Environment (ENV), Justice Liberty and Security (JLS), Enterprise 
and Industry (ENTR) and Internal Market (MARKT) – completed more than 
60% of all Commission IAs, and other DGs only performed a few IAs over the 
2003-2009 timeframe.  
 
                                                   
20 See http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/roadmaps_2010_en.htm.  
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Figure 3 – Number of IAs per DG, at December 2009 
15
NUMBER OF IAS PER DG
 
 
In any event, available data confirm that the Commission IAs have become 
more complete and transparent over time. In particular: 
 The assessment (qualitative or quantitative) of economic, social and 
environmental impacts has become more systematic. Figure 4 below shows 
that in 2005, less than 30% of the IAs assessed the environmental impact, 
whereas economic and social impacts were considered in less than 70% of 
the IAs. In 2009, environmental impacts were assessed in 60% of the IAs 
and economic and social impacts were assessed in almost all IAs. 
 
Figure 4 – Assessment of impacts, Commission IAs, 2003-2009 
21
 
 
 The assessment of alternatives has become more systematic. As shown in 
figure 5 below, the costs and benefits of alternative policy options are more 
frequently quantified and monetized in Commission IAs, especially 
compared to the 2004-2005 period, in which the assessment of alternatives 
was very limited. Today, in approximately 30% of the cases the European 
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Commission provides an indication of the net benefits or cost-effectiveness 
of the policy options considered – a figure that must be appraised also in 
light of the fact that not all Commission IAs are related to binding policy 
actions.  
 
Figure 5 – Assessment of alternative policy options, Commission IAs, 2003-2009 
24
 
 
 The degree of sophistication of Commission IAs is on the increase. The 
number of IAs that embarked in difficult economic analyses such as the 
calculation of the number of lives saved by a given policy option is increasing 
year on year. At the same time, the Commission makes more use of discount 
rates when assessing future impacts; performs risk assessment more often; 
and offers a sensitivity analysis to check the robustness of its assumptions.  
 
Figure 6 – Sophistication of Commission IAs, 2003-2009 (selected indicators) 
25
 
 
RIA IN THE EUROPEAN UNION - 2010 ANDREA RENDA – DRAFT AT 9/20/2010 
PAGE 13 OF 28 
1.2.2 Other EU institutions 
While the European Commission has managed to make systematic use of IA 
tools, it is no mystery that other EU institutions such as the European 
Parliament and the Council have largely failed to achieve the objective of 
performing assessments on their major amendments on Commission’s 
proposals, despite their commitments expressed in the 2003 “Inter-
Institutional agreement on better lawmaking”, and in the 2005 “Common 
Approach to Impact Assessment”. This also means that European Commission 
IAs, once the proposal is amended during the co-decision procedure, lose their 
representativeness and their usefulness for potential users such as national 
governments.  
More in detail, the European Parliament has gradually replaced the practice of 
IA with the commissioning of external background studies and briefing notes, 
which normally are not linked with the original Commission IA, and do not 
feature the structure of an IA document. The Council is reportedly making more 
use of Commission IAs, but after a pilot project on a limited number of 
amendments back in 2004, has dropped completely the production of IAs.  
In a recent publication, Renda et al. (2009) debate whether the failure of the 
Common Approach to IA should lead to a new approach to inter-institutional 
dialogue at the EU level. Below, we briefly discuss this issue together with the 
other emerging trends in EU impact assessment.  
1.3 The future of EU impact assessment  
The EU experience with IA is considered as being fairly successful, but margins 
for improvement certainly exist. As confirmed also by the 70 opinions gathered 
by the Commission during the consultation on the future of smart regulation 
that ran between 23 April and 25 June 2010, the issues to be tackled in the years 
to come include the following21.  
• First of all, many arguments seem to point at the need for an expanded role 
of the European Commission in performing IA throughout the policy cycle, 
including the co-decision procedure: these include the (current) failure of 
the Common Approach, the need to strengthen the commitment of EU 
institutions towards evidence-based policymaking, the need to provide an 
interface between EU and national levels, the economies of scale the 
Commission can reach in performing IA, and the need to ensure that 
administrative burdens are measured for each and every new piece of EU 
legislation (in its definitive form). 
• In turn, expanded competence of the Commission calls for a stronger 
oversight on the quality of the Commission IAs: this can be achieved in 
several ways, including strengthening the IAB, and enhancing/ 
institutionalising the role of existing networks such as the HLG of national 
                                                   
21 The consultation document and opinions espressed can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/governance/better_regulation/smart_regulation/consultation_en.htm.  
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regulatory experts and the HLG of independent stakeholders, but not by 
appointing a brand new independent agency.  
• There is a need to effectively manage the resources available for the 
implementation of better regulation at EU level: especially if the 
Commission will have an expanded role in formulating and updating IAs 
throughout the policy cycle, then the need to focus on some key initiatives 
and strengthen the analysis of binding proposals rather than broader 
strategy documents becomes more compelling. This also includes a careful 
allocation of resources between ex ante impact assessment and ex post 
evaluation.  
• Accordingly, there is a need for stronger targeting of IAs, control on the 
selection of proposals and decisions on proportionality (i.e. depth and scope 
of the analysis for each step of the process). This activity can be performed 
by the SecGen/IAB, but following more closely the indications that should be 
issued by the Council as regards the strategic priorities in the EU agenda 
every year. Proportionality of analysis should be decided by having regard to 
the whole policy cycle of the proposal at hand, also by deciding when the 
biggest IA effort should be placed.   
• There is also a need to clarify the future role of the SCM and its relation to 
the IA system. Currently, many aspects of the Action Programme remain 
obscure: whether the SCM will be applied more broadly than IA; whether it 
will require systematic and capillary quantification of burdens for each 
binding proposal coming out of Brussels; whether it will be expanded to 
other compliance costs; whether the targets will be “net”; whether the 
baseline will be kept “live”; and whether the Commission will have to update 
each and every quantification of burdens as its proposals flow into the co-
decision procedure.  
• Finally, multi-level convergence can be achieved by carefully implementing 
the Action Programme on administrative burdens, and using the SCM as a 
“shortcut” to achieve more convergent better regulation agendas in the years 
to come. In order to achieve this goal, however, more sophisticated 
safeguards have to be put in place to ensure coordination between the EU 
measurement and national ones – provided that they will effectively be 
launched by all member states and with sufficient rigour.  
1.4 The EU impact assessment system: lessons learned 
Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of the European Commission 
with IA procedures.  
 First, the successful implementation of IA takes time. The European 
Commission has relatively quickly managed to introduce IA due to its 
previous experience with more partial assessments (such as the BIA, or the 
environmental impact assessments); due to pressure by Member States 
wishing to establish guarantees that the wave of structural reforms that was 
triggered by the Single Market plan in 1985-1992 would not result in bad-
quality new legislation; due to the relatively sophisticated competences it 
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hosts in its services compared to national public administrations in several 
EU member states; and due to the decision to strengthen the governance of 
the system by appointing the IAB.  
 Second, the design of the system is essential for its success. The first years of 
implementation of the RIA system had led to some disappointment among 
commentators and stakeholders. Demand for quality assurance systems 
within the Commission led to the appointment of the IAB, which in turn 
generated significant pressure on DGs (see also below). The final word on 
this debate, in any event, has not been spelled: business stakeholders, in 
particular, would like to see the appointment of an independent body in 
charge of overseeing the Commission’s activities. Even without embarking in 
a complex institutional puzzle – the creation of yet another EU agency – 
there is significant consensus on the need to increase transparency by calling 
on the Commission to publish draft IAs for consultation before the IAB 
decides on their quality. Finally, several additional gatekeepers are entering 
the stage, from the European Parliament to the European Court of Auditors 
and the Stoiber group, all with the firm intention to have a stronger say on 
the development of the system in the years to come.  
 Third, a RIA system becomes mature alongside with the sense of ownership 
of administrations. The fact that the several DGs have yet to be fully 
involved in the process (see Figure 3 above) reveals margin for improvement 
at the EU level. On the other hand, DGs such as MARKT and ENTR are 
working on their own, expanded version of the IA guidelines to make sure 
their officials produce better proposals and do not elicit negative comments 
by the IAB. This reveals the importance of oversight bodies at the centre of 
government, and the need for a fine-tuning of the IA methodology according 
to the sector in which IA is performed.  
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2 RIA IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: EMERGING TRENDS 
Compared to the progress achieved by the European Commission in ex ante 
impact assessment, most EU member states appear to significantly lag behind. 
While one country, the UK, clearly took the lead in Europe, significantly 
determining the launch of the IA system in Europe, to date in several Member 
States IA is still on paper, or has even not been launched. A snapshot of the 
current adoption-implementation gap is provided by the comparison of Figure 7 
and Figure 8 below. In Figure 7, the results of the OECD “government at a 
glance” in 2009 are reported, with specific focus on explicit requirements for 
RIA processes in Central government. These variables describe the extent to 
which RIA is sponsored and formally adopted in central governmental 
structures. 
 
Figure 7 – Requirements for RIA in central governments, with sensitivity analysis, 
2005 v. 2008 
 
Source: OECD, Government at a glance, 2009 
 
When looking at the actual implementation of RIA in practice, it is important to 
define RIA in the first place. The ENBR project back in 2005 hosted a 
discussion between experts on what can constitute a valid definition of RIA. 
According to ENBR experts, a RIA has four components (ENBR Handbook on 
Methodology 2006:6): 
1) A systematic, mandatory, and consistent assessment of aspects of social, 
economic, or environmental impacts such as benefits and/or costs. This 
means that an IA is part of a system of impact analysis based on clear scope 
and directions. The scope can be narrow or broad, but it is clear that an IA is 
not an intermittent or voluntary effort to examine impacts.  
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2) Affecting interests external to the government. The purpose of IA is to 
expand the range of impacts relevant to decisions to external impacts. An 
assessment only of fiscal or government budget implications is an input into 
traditional fiscal policy, and is not IA in the modern sense. 
3) Of proposed regulations and other kinds of legal and policy instruments. 
Governments use many policy instruments to implement policy, and ex ante 
assessment of impacts can be used for most or all of those instruments.  
4) To i) inform policy decisions before a regulation, legal instrument, or policy 
is adopted; or ii) assess external impacts of a group of laws or regulations 
to support reforms; or iii) assess the accuracy of an earlier IA.  
This definition, in and of itself, led ENBR researchers to exclude many 
documents published by national governments, which appear to lack some of 
the typical features of a RIA. This already created concerns in the real nature of 
the documents being produced by national governments in Europe, which are 
termed as RIA, but in fact are something different from a systematic 
requirement to perform ex ante impact assessment of proposed legislation. 
Figure 8 below shows the number of actual IA documents produced by 
governments that matched the ENBR definition illustrated above at the end of 
2008, for each of the countries covered by the ENBR DIADEM database. As 
shown in the picture, only the UK, Ukraine and the European Commission 
could be said to have reached a sufficient level of RIA documents – with many 
differences – among the countries covered.  
 
Figure 8 –Impact Assessments in the DIADEM database, end of 2008 
 
Source: DIADEM database, www.enbr.org  
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Interesting and more updated results were found, for a more limited number of 
countries, by Staronova (2010) for the Central and Eastern European Countries, 
and by the OECD EU15 project. Overall, the review of better regulation in the 15 
countries has revealed the existence of a number of problems in the 
implementation of ex ante impact assessment, including, most notably, the 
need to clarify the link between IA and administrative burden reduction 
programmes, which appear more widespread and more strongly implemented 
at national level. The reason for this may well be that the Standard Cost Model, 
on which burdens reduction programmes are based, is a less intrusive model as 
it does not require a real change in the culture of public administrations; and 
also because it is easier to communicate to stakeholders, as it leads to clearly 
identifiable reduction proposals. At the same time, however the SCM has a 
much narrower scope that ex ante IA, since it only looks at administrative 
burdens and can potentially extended to compliance costs, but does not look at 
the benefits of legislation in place or alternative policy options.  
2.1 Grouping EU countries 
Looking at the EU27 landscape, it is possible to distinguish different types of 
countries as regards their experience on IA procedures.  
 Pioneers. As already explained, one country – the UK – can be defined as 
pioneer in Europe, having experimented with IA practices since the 1980s 
and with a more full-fledged IA since 1998. Other countries, i.e. Denmark, 
Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Sweden have been defined as 
pioneering countries, since they formally adopted RIA before the OECD 
agreement on regulatory reform. However, in none of these countries RIA 
has been successfully implemented in the policy process.  
 CEE countries. Finally, some Central and Eastern European countries – also 
pushed by the OECD Sigma project – have launched RIA pilots back in the 
1990s. This is the case, in particular, of Hungary and Estonia, which 
started experimenting with RIA in 1994 and 1999, respectively (Staronova, 
2010); in the Czech Republic, the Legislative Rules of Government 
introduced a RIA requirement in 1998 but it only entered into force in 2007. 
In Slovakia, requirements for RIA were introduced in November 2001 via 
an amendment of the Legislative Rules of the Government, following 
recommendations by the Audit of State Administration. In 2004, the 
Slovenian government signed The Act on Cooperation between the 
National Assembly and the Government in EU Affairs, which obliges the 
Government to carry out assessments of the impact and implications of draft 
EU-related measures. In Poland, already at the end of 2001 IA became 
compulsory for all the legislative drafts adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
and a Department for impact assessment was established at the Government 
Legislation Centre. Early starters have, however, faced several difficulties in 
effectively implementing RIA in their policy cycle. For example, Hungary, 
despite its early attempt in 1994, has never managed to produce good quality 
RIA documents over time, and reportedly lags behind other CEE countries in 
several respects, including consultation, the identification and analysis of 
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impacts, and the overall quality of the assessment. Estonia, on the other 
hand, has gradually managed to improve the system and was later joined by 
the Czech Republic, where only a few, high quality RIAs have been produced 
to date22. 
 Late adopters often have the advantage of learning from other countries’ 
mistakes, and can achieve better outcomes within a lower time frame. A first 
consequence of this has been the emergence of a group of successful late 
adopters in the EU27. For example, Ireland has abandoned its fragmented 
system that entailed separate assessments of various impacts (including 
poverty impact assessment) to launch a more comprehensive RIA system in 
2007. Similarly, the government of The Netherlands is considering the 
launch of a comprehensive RIA system that replaces the previous three-
pronged ex ante assessment model, based on business impacts, 
environmental impacts and the practicability and enforcement assessment 
in use since 1994. Sweden has made enormous progress in its adoption and 
implementation of RIA, and in December 2007, the Government issued a 
Regulatory Impact Assessment Ordinance, which supersedes the Ordinance 
on Special Impact Assessment of the Effects of Rules on Conditions for Small 
Enterprises, which previously regulated IA work. The new Ordinance states 
that IA must now be carried out for every new or amended regulation. The 
watchdog set up by the business confederation, the NNR, has observed that 
in the past eight years IA has progressed noticeably in Sweden, but also 
stated that too few good RIAs are being produced. Finally, after years in 
which the RIA system had faced significant adoption problems, let alone 
implementation, France has launched a new system of impact studies since 
1 September 2009: the system possesses a unique feature in Europe, as 
impact studies have been made a constitutional requirement. Absent a 
(sufficiently detailed) RIA document attached to bills sent by the 
Government to parliament, the Speakers of either of the two assemblies may 
refuse to place the related policy item on the agenda, including if they find it 
inadequate.  
 Countries dominated by the “cutting red tape” agenda. There is a clearly 
emerging group of countries where the better regulation rhetoric has evolved 
into a de-regulation and simplification one, leading to the blossoming of 
programmes to cut red tape, and to gradually shift the focus towards 
administrative burdens reduction, and away from more full-fledged RIA. 
These countries certainly include Germany, where the formal adoption of 
RIA – very much in line with the original OECD approach – never led to a 
real implementation of RIA in practice, while the Standard Cost Model has 
successfully permeated the regulatory agenda, and is currently being revised 
to cover, more generally, regulatory costs to businesses. Similar 
developments can be observed in Denmark, due to an early and very 
successful implementation of the SCM; in Finland and in Austria, where 
business associations and a fistful of courageous academics are trying to 
                                                   
22 Staronova, 2010. 
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create momentum for RIA in an environment in which the dominant form of 
policymaking does not accommodate for real transparency23.  
 Finally, a group of laggard countries seems to face important problems in 
mainstreaming RIA into their often complex policymaking process. Italy, 
for example, adopted the RIA procedure quite early (in 1999), but have never 
managed to really implement it to date, if not limited to one independent 
sectoral regulator and a fistful of regional governments – the regulatory 
framework to support RIA adoption in Central Government was completed 
only in the spring of 2009. On the other end of the spectrum, Greece 
decided to start experimenting with RIA in 2007, but launched an overly 
ambitious project, which ended up almost impossible to take up all at once.24 
Finally, Bulgaria, Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Spain and Portugal 
seem light years away from a successful implementation of RIA. Similar 
issues could be said about Luxembourg, Malta and Cyprus.  
Table 1 below summarises my conclusions in terms of grouping of countries 
according to their RIA implementation. It bears observing, in this respect, that  
implementation should not be equated with success, but only with the 
achievement of a regular production of RIA documents as a mandatory 
requirement, supported by guidance on how to produce the analysis, and 
subject to scrutiny and internal or external quality control. Examples of 
countries that have adopted RIA but not implemented it are, unfortunately, 
abundant; in addition, countries that have indeed implemented RIA have 
sometimes failed, sometimes only partly succeeded: the example of the UK, 
where efforts to mainstream RIA in the policy process have led to overlapping 
generations of regulatory reforms, patchy and fragmented implementation, 
tendency towards box-ticking, limited quantification of impacts, and finally a 
remarkable shift towards the reduction of administrative burdens generated by 
the stock of legislation is not necessarily the most successful case study one can 
think of.  
 
Table 1 – Groups of countries according to effective implementation of RIA 
Pioneers CEE countries 
with RIA 
development 
Late adopters Red-tape-
dominated 
Laggards 
United Kingdom Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia, 
Slovenia  
France, Ireland, 
The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Belgium 
(Flanders) 
Austria, Belgium 
(Central gov), 
Denmark, Finland, 
Germany  
Bulgaria, Greece, 
Italy, Lithuania, 
Latvia, 
Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal, 
Romania, Spain  
Cyprus 
Source: Author’s elaboration from several sources. 
 
Notwithstanding the rather depressing picture that emerges from the current 
implementation of RIA in the EU27, several lessons can be drawn from the 
                                                   
23 Weigel (2008); and Biegelbauer and Meyer (2007, 2008).  
24 Hatzis, A. (2006).  
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experience of past research projects, direct field experience, academic literature 
and reports by international organisations such as the OECD and the World 
Bank. I try to briefly summarise them below.  
 Political commitment remains essential. Typical examples are those of 
France and The Netherlands, where comprehensive RIA systems have been 
or are being launched as a result of a solid demand for regulatory 
governance and reform. Where commitment has been limited or absent (e.g. 
Italy, Poland, Germany), even the most ambitious RIA strategy has failed. 
 Oversight and coordination. The invaluable role of central watchdogs has 
led several countries (but also the European Commission) to recognise the 
need for a centralised gatekeeper entrusted with the task of managing the 
RIA process and its development. Even where this has happened, the level of 
commitment and investment has markedly differed: Radaelli et al. (2007) 
reported that in four countries (Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and 
Spain) the number of employees dedicated to RIA is unknown 
notwithstanding the presence of a central unit; whereas Ireland and Italy 
have very light central unit with 1.5 employees respectively. To the contrary, 
larger units exist in Czech Republic (9 employees), Poland (10), Sweden (12), 
and Belgium (20); whereas the UK stands as an outlier with approximately 
70 employees. 
 Hierarchy. Another important lesson that can be drawn is related to the 
relative positioning of the central coordinating body vis à vis 
administrations in charge of RIA. In countries where the oversight unit has 
been put at the same level of administrations in charge of producing RIAs, as 
unus inter pares, the moral suasion impact of its decisions has been 
limited25. To the contrary, where the watchdog acts from the centre of 
government, with a somewhat superior authority, there is often no need to 
grant the watchdog powers to formally reject proposal: as in the case of the 
US OIRA and the EU IAB, moral suasion is enough, no administration would 
dare to neglect the gentle advice of the watchdog.  
 Expectations. Some national governments have made the mistake of 
launching an overly ambitious RIA system, and/or raised too high 
expectations among stakeholders. Examples, as already mentioned, include 
the European Commission (due to initial promises of full quantification), 
Italy, and Greece. Given that RIA takes several years to produce meaningful 
results, including i.a. enhanced predictability, transparency and 
accountability of policymaking, as well as greater policy coherence, it is 
important that reforms are communicated with a word of caution and by 
keeping in mind a reasonably long time horizon. Otherwise, the first 
episodes of disappointment among stakeholders may jeopardize the entire 
process.  
 Gradual introduction v. big bang. Connected to the problem of expectations 
is the problem of how and when to introduce RIA. The experience of 
countries such as the UK, France and the Netherlands suggests that it may 
take several years before a system of partial, narrower-scope assessments 
                                                   
25 Staronova (2010) 
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can generated momentum and demand for a more comprehensive RIA 
system. Also the European Commission has gone through years of separate 
assessments (the BIA, the environmental and sustainability impact 
assessments developed by different DGs) before moving to an integrated 
system: and yet it took several years before the Commission services got 
used and acquainted with the specifics and the technicalities of IA.  
 Exploit the link with the SCM. Faced with problems in generating the 
cultural change needed in public administrations, several governments have 
opted for reforms related to simplification and the reduction fo 
administrative burdens. Given the political commitment required for the 
implementation of the SCM – i.e. the ex ante commitment to reduce burdens 
by a given percentage before actually measuring them – the SCM has proven 
easier to communicate to business stakeholders. At the same time, the SCM 
does not require revolutionary changes in the way bureaucrats behave, as 
most of the process is carried out in conjunction with external consultants 
and is aimed at the stock, rather than the flow of legislation. That said, once 
administrative burdens have been measured, reduction proposals must be 
assessed as regards their potential costs and benefits for society as a whole. 
As explained in Allio and Renda (2010), IA procedures are required to 
successfully complete the implementation of the SCM: accordingly, a new 
momentum for introducing a comprehensive IA system may emerge in all 
those countries – practically, all EU member states – that have decided to 
embark in the measurement of administrative burdens, especially after the 
Spring Council in 2007.  
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CONCLUSION 
A few years ago, it would have been difficult to predict that in 2010, the most 
(and perhaps the only) successful and established RIA system in Europe would 
become that of the European Commission. Indeed, an analysis of RIA practices 
in the EU27 reveals that impact assessment is navigating through rather 
difficult waters. The difficulty in spotting results, the impact of the financial 
crisis and the debate on stress-testing of legislation, the failure to account for 
enforcement and compliance and to merge RIA practice with insights from 
modern economics all contribute towards a re-consideration of RIA, despite 
recent attempts to re-launch the system in countries like the Netherlands, 
Sweden, France and Italy. In this quagmire, more practical models such as the 
SCM thrive, since they appear more down to earth, more handy for 
administrations, and overall more useful for businesses.  
The rather discouraging landscape emerging from field work carried out by 
experts in projects such as ENBR and EVIA, but also clearly portrayed in recent 
OECD publications, calls for a moment of reflection. The EU and national 
experiences suggest that RIA takes time, that it must be carefully designed to 
activate the appropriate mechanisms (from learning to principal-agent 
mechanisms, which in turn depend on the principal scope of the RIA system), 
that it crucially depends on how expectations are managed during its 
implementation, and that political commitment remains essential in order to 
achieve a reasonably long and credible time frame for reform. In addition, 
recent developments highlight the importance of developing a network of 
gatekeepers, internal and external to the central government administration, 
able to act both ex ante (as in the case of oversight agencies and advisory bodies 
such as Actal and its homologous in other countries) and ex post (as in the case 
of courts of auditors in some EU countries and the EU. 
The solution to the current impasse probably lies in a twofold strategy:  
 First, efforts at the EU and national level should be merged into a 
comprehensive, multi-level strategy for the quality of lawmaking in the 
European Union: this could be achieved in particular by exploiting the 
momentum offered by the programmes enacted in all Member States to 
measure and reduce administrative burdens.  
 Second, the precondition for making RIA a success is to “first, make it 
good”: the methodological approach and the overall scope of the exercise 
have to be reconciled with sound economics. 
In this latter respect, it is probably time to go back to the pioneering experience 
in RIA development, that of the US, to recall some of its main features that have 
been often neglected when implementing RIA in European countries.  
First, in the US RIA remains mandatory only for secondary legislation, within a 
strong principal-agent chain that links government agencies to the President of 
the US, acting through the OIRA. Emphasis on quantification and calculation of 
net benefits is functional to the need of centre-of-government to control more 
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specialized bureaucracies: despite some recent attempts in this direction, 
Congress and independent agencies have no mandatory RIA requirement.  
Second, over the past few years the US witnessed an growing activity of 
gatekeepers such as the GAO and the Congressional Budget Office. For example, 
the GAO has recently been rather vocal in identifying gaps in the transparency 
of OIRA’s involvement in rule making, raising concerns about the results of the 
cumulative procedural and analytical requirements placed on rule making over 
the years26; and advocating for more transparency at OIRA to better allow the 
public to understand the effects of OIRA’s reviews. The GAO periodically 
reviews selected rules as regards the appraisal procedure that take place inside 
the agencies27. In addition, a degree of oversight on the RIA process is exerted 
by the CBO through expert reports that look at the activity of specific agencies, 
for example the EPA. More occasionally, the CBO also reviews the functioning 
of the RIA system in government agencies. 
Third, the Obama administration has marked a change in the approach to RIA, 
thanks mostly to the appointment of Cass R. Sunstein as the new chairman of 
the OIRA. The new approach at OIRA is likely to devote more attention to 
behavioral law and economics and the analysis of individual incentives and 
consumer behaviour, something that is often difficult to reconcile with mere 
quantification of costs and benefits28. This development would in my opinion 
bring more substance to the current practice of RIA, offering a potential avenue 
to more sophisticated policy appraisal also in Europe. And it would put an end 
to the current schism between policy evaluation in academia and in real life: 
after all, back in 1998 Anthony Ogus observed that the emergence of regulatory 
appraisal in the UK was a “neglected opportunity” for law and economics, and 
that the use of regulatory appraisal in the US and in the UK had been 
insufficiently permeated by this discipline, especially for what concerned the 
understanding of the relationship between legal rules and human behaviour29. 
Problems, according to Ogus, would mostly relate to “the predicted levels of 
                                                   
26  See GAO-07-791, at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07791.pdf; and GAO-05-939T, at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05939t.pdf. 
27  A recent GAO report issued in April 2009 reviews 139 major rules including 16 case-study 
rules, and finds that: (i) OIRA’s reviews of agencies’ draft rules often resulted in changes (of 
12 case-study rules subject to OIRA review, 10 resulted in changes, about half of which 
included changes to the regulatory text); (ii) Agencies used various methods to document 
OIRA’s reviews, which generally met disclosure requirements, but the transparency of this 
documentation could be improved; (iii) out of eight prior GAO recommendations to improve 
the transparency OIRA has implemented only one—to clarify information posted about 
meetings with outside parties regarding draft rules under OIRA review . 
28  See, for an example, the first review letter sent by the OIRA under the Obama 
administration, to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) related to 
the new “Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program”, available online at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/postreview/Tire_Fuel_Efficiency_Consumer_Information_
Final_Rule.pdf. Cass Sunstein’s idea of “libertarian paternalism” and “behavioural law and 
economics” is elaborated in several publications, including the recent book with Richard 
Thaler, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness, Yale University 
Press, 2008. 
29  A. Ogus, Regulatory Appraisal: A Neglected Opportunity for Law and Economics, 
European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 6, Number 1, July 1998 , pp. 53-68(16). 
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compliance; the counterfactual (the state of the world absent the regulation); 
the types of standards involved in the proposed measure; possible alternative 
regulatory techniques; and consideration of indirect effects.”  
This is what occurs in many IAs around the world today. Perhaps the best way 
to re-launch RIA as a useful tool for ex ante policy assessment would be to start 
from achieving the methodological tools and sophistication that are needed to 
ensure that legislators can understand markets and individual incentives before 
enacting legislation.  
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